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This paper presents a model in which inequality affects per capita income when individuals decide
to invest in education taking into account their life expectancy, which depends to a large extent on
the human capital of their parents. Our results show the existence of multiple steady states depend-
ing on the initial distribution of education. The low steady state is a poverty trap in which children
raised in poor families have low life expectancy and work as non-educated workers. The empiri-
cal evidence suggests that the life expectancy mechanism explains a major part of the relationship
between inequality and human capital accumulation.
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Increases in life expectancy and human capital accumulation have accelerated since
the post-World War II period in most parts of the world. However, in spite of the conver-
gence in life expectancy across countries during this period (see, for example, Becker et al.,
2005), in 2000 there was still an immense gap between the rich and the poor world: life ex-
pectancy was 78 years in OECD countries but only 47 years in Sub-Saharan Africa, where
the gap with rich countries is increasing nowadays due to AIDS being widespread. Like-
wise, the striking disparities in human capital are also evident. Whereas the secondary
school enrolment rate was almost 100% in rich countries, more than 70% of children in
Sub-Saharan Africa were not enrolled in secondary schooling and, therefore, entered the
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labour market as unskilled workers from childhood. These disparities in schooling are
also accompanied by huge differences in the distribution of education. Thus, the human
capital Gini coefﬁcient in Sub-Saharan Africa (0.56) is twice as high as that of OECD coun-
tries (0.21). In this paper we argue that high human capital inequality, low life expectancy
and low human capital accumulation rates reinforce each other and may explain the per-
sistence of poverty in a great part of the world.
In particular, we analyse a mechanism that connects inequality and growth through
differences in life expectancy among individuals that have different socioeconomic status.
We include endogenous life expectancy in a model populated by heterogeneous agents in
which individuals live for two periods and differ in their second period survival proba-
bility. In particular, we consider that life expectancy is conditioned by the human capital
of the families which individuals are born into, an assumption supported by empirical
evidence (see, among others, Case et al., 2002, or Currie and Moretti, 2003). Given their
expected survival probability, individuals choose the optimal time devoted to becoming
educated in order to maximize their intertemporal utility. Consistent with the evidence,
poor individuals invest optimally a low amount of human capital since their low life ex-
pectancy increases their opportunity cost of becoming educated. At the same time, this
low investment in human capital will hamper their descendents survival probability, gen-
erating a source of poverty persistence across generations. In contrast, rich individuals
have more incentives to invest in human capital since the time horizon to enjoy the re-
turns of their investment is longer. Similarly, the higher stock of human capital of rich
individuals beneﬁts the time horizons of their future generation and, as a result, high in-
vestment rates persist in the rich dynasty. Therefore, the model offers an explanation for
the observed persistence of poverty and inequality not only between countries but also
within an economy.
In spite of its simplicity, an interesting characteristic of our model is that it relies on
elements that can be easily approximated, such as years of schooling and Mincer coefﬁ-
cients, which allow us to offer some quantitative results. In particular, the model exhibits
multiple steady states for realistic values of the parameters. Furthermore, we also ﬁnd
that for interior solutions a mean-preserving spread in the survival probability reduces
the average human capital in the economy. Therefore, inequality not only affects human
capital in the long run but also in the transition to the steady state, suggesting that those
countries with higher inequality in the distribution of education will experience lower hu-
man capital accumulation rates. As parents’ human capital determines children’s survival
probability, the distribution of education affects average life expectancy, therefore inﬂu-
encing the human capital investment rate in the economy.
The predictions of the model are highly supported by empirical evidence. For aHUMAN CAPITAL INEQUALITY AND LIFE EXPECTANCY 3
sample of 92 countries, on the one hand, we ﬁnd that less human capital inequality is sig-
niﬁcantly related to higher life expectancy even controlling for the stock of human capital.
On the other hand, higher life expectancy is found to positively inﬂuence the accumula-
tion of human capital. Moreover, as an additional support to our model, we obtain that
once we control for life expectancy the signiﬁcant inﬂuence of human capital inequality
on secondary school enrolment rates disappears, which suggests that the strong positive
association between human capital inequality and the accumulation of human capital op-
erates mainly through the life expectancy channel.
This paper is closely related to the extensive literature on the effects of inequality
on economic growth. Whereas traditional channels have mainly focused on ﬁscal policy
distortions (Bertola, 1993, Alesina and Rodrik, 1994, or Persson and Tabellini, 1994) and
credit market constraints (Galor and Zeira, 1993, Banerjee and Newman, 1993, Aghion and
Bolton, 1997, Piketti, 1997 and other references in Aghion et al., 1999), here we concentrate
on how human capital inequality may discourage growth by reducing life expectancy and
investment in education, rather than by increasing fertility, as in De la Croix and Doepke
(2003) and Moav (2005).
In recent years the role played by life expectancy in determining optimal education
decisions has received increasing attention. Most of these contributions have examined
different aspects of the link between the "demographic transition" and long-run develop-
ment incorporating mortality rates or life expectancy in the analysis (e.g., Kalemli-Ozcan,
2002, Cervellati and Sunde, 2005, Soares, 2005, or Tamura, 2006) or, alternatively, through
investment in health capital as a prerequisite for sustained economic growth (Chakraborty,
2004). However, although the evidence shows clearly that poor and rich individuals dis-
play differences in their life expectancy, previous contributions have not analysed the in-
ﬂuence that disparities in life expectancy can have on the accumulation of human capital
among individuals and how this affects inequality.
Moreover, the paper also contributes to the emerging empirical literature that anal-
yses the inﬂuence of life expectancy and adult mortality on economic growth. For ex-
ample, Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) have found that life expectancy seems to be one of the
most robust factors affecting growth rates. The speciﬁc channels through which life ex-
pectancy may inﬂuence growth have been analysed by Lorentzen et al. (2006), who ﬁnd
that higher adult mortality reduces investment, lowers the accumulation of human capital
and increases fertility (in line with previous results, such as Bloom et al., 2003, or Zhang
and Zhang, 2005) explaining a great part of Africa’s tragedy. Our paper complements
these results not only by analysing the effect of life expectancy on the accumulation of
human capital but also by estimating the effects of human capital inequality on average
life expectancy. Apart from corroborating that higher life expectancy encourages the ac-HUMAN CAPITAL INEQUALITY AND LIFE EXPECTANCY 4
cumulation of human capital, we provide evidence that human capital inequality reduces
countries’ life expectancy.
One of the interesting ﬁndings of our paper is that its policy implications differ
from those that obtain poverty persistency assuming credit market imperfections and non-
convexities. According to our model, even if credit markets are perfect, poor individuals
with low life expectancy may optimally invest in a low amount of education since the time
span to enjoy the investment returns is very short. In this context, our model suggests that
those policies oriented towards bringing the life expectancy of the poor closer to that of
rich individuals would enhance human capital investment and growth much more than
direct income transfers.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 1 displays the basic structure of
the model. In order to ﬁnd a speciﬁc function for the survival probability in accordance
with the evidence, Section 2 reviews some of the empirical literature that studies the rela-
tionship between socioeconomic variables and life expectancy. We then parameterize the
model and analyse the relationship between inequality and growth. Section 3 studies the
implications of the model empirically. Finally, Section 4 presents the conclusions reached.
1. The model
Inthissectionwepresentaverysimplemodeltoanalysetherelationshipbetweeninequal-
ity, life expectancy and growth. For this purpose we consider an overlapping generation
model in which individuals can live at most for two periods. The probability of living
during the entire ﬁrst period is one, whereas the probability of living until the end of the
second period is πt+1. At the end of the ﬁrst period each individual gives birth to another
so all individuals have a descendent. In every period the economy produces a single good
that is used for consumption.
1.1 Life Expectancy
The economy is populated by individuals that differ in terms of family wealth but which
are identical in their preferences and innate abilities. We assume that an individual’s life
expectancy will depend on the economic status of the family which the individual is born
into. In line with the empirical evidence, individuals born into rich families have higher
life expectancy than those born into poor families, who are more likely to be affected by
undernourishment during the early stages of life and an unhealthier environment during
childhood, for instance, lower standards of hygiene at home, a less healthy diet or less
use of preventive and curative medical services. In particular, as human capital is one of
the main determinants of income and wealth, we assume that parents’ human capital willHUMAN CAPITAL INEQUALITY AND LIFE EXPECTANCY 5
determine the survival probability of their children.1







it is the human capital of the parent. Given that schooling years is the most com-
mon measure of human capital, throughout the paper we make the survival probability
depend on parents’ schooling years instead of a broader concept of human capital. In the
next section we use a speciﬁc equation for survival probability according to the empirical
evidence of the relationship between life expectancy and schooling years.
1.2 Technology
As there are several mechanisms that connect inequality and growth, our aim is to make
the model as simple as possible in order to isolate the role that life expectancy can play
in explaining a connection between inequality and growth. To do so, on the technology
side, we focus entirely on the effect that life expectancy has on the accumulation of hu-
man capital and we assume no physical capital accumulation as in most of the literature
that analyses the effect of longevity on growth.2 This assumption is not too strong con-
sidering that this model will mainly be applied to poor countries where life expectancy is
particularly low, their technology is labour-intensive and, therefore, the per capita stock of
physical capital is very low.
In the ﬁrst period of life individuals are endowed with one unit of time. They allo-
cate Lt




where At is a function of other production inputs and 0 ￿ Lt
it ￿ 1. For simplicity, we
consider that At grows at a constant rate g,
At = A(1+ g)t, (3)




1 In Section 2.1 we summarize some empirical evidence that widely supports our assumptions. For a recent
survey on the determinants of mortality see for example Cutler et al. (2006).
2 See, among others, Ehrlich and Lui (1991), Boucekkine et al. (2002) and Soares (2005). As an alternative to
this assumption, one could also consider a small open economy with a ﬁxed interest rate and a Cobb-Douglas




Individuals allocate the remaining units of their time (1 ￿ Lt
it) towards acquiring
formal education for the second period according to the function:
ht
it+1 = θ(1￿ Lt
it), (5)
where θ is the number of years of the ﬁrst period and ht
it+1 the schooling years that indi-
vidual i accumulates when young.







it+1 = 1. Thus, the higher the human capital stock accumulated during the ﬁrst
period, the higher the income produced in the second period. The speciﬁcation of the pro-
duction function in the second period relies on the work of Mincer (1974), since it relates
the log of income to schooling years
lnyt
it+1 = ln A + αht
it+1. (7)
Therefore, the coefﬁcient α (the Mincer coefﬁcient) can be interpreted as the return of edu-
cation.
Equation (5) assumes that the stock of human capital in period t + 1 is entirely the
result of the years of education acquired in the ﬁrst period of life. Even though years
of education is an incomplete indicator of the stock of human capital, one of the main
advantages of constructing a consistent model around years of education is that it can
provide some quantitative results, given the existing data sets such as, for example Barro
and Lee (2001). In particular, the speciﬁcation of the production function in the second
period of life, displayed in equation (6), is a good approximation of individuals’ income
since there is a large literature that provides empirical estimates of the value of the Mincer
coefﬁcient α (see Krueguer and Lindahl, 2001).
Other studies specify a broader technology of the production of human capital that
includes the stock of human capital of parents as well as the average human capital in
the economy (e.g., Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992, or De la Croix and Doepke, 2003). In
these models, in order to achieve endogenous growth it is necessary to assume constant
returns to scale in the accumulable factors, human capital of parents and average human
capital. This implies that the production function of the human capital of individuals is
a concave function of the human capital of the parents. Therefore, the aggregate average
of human capital will be lower the more unequal the distribution of human capital is.HUMAN CAPITAL INEQUALITY AND LIFE EXPECTANCY 7
In such a case, the model would display a negative association between human capital
distribution and economic growth even in the case where all individuals had the same
life expectancy. Hence, we have opted for a much simpler speciﬁcation of human capital
technology in order to isolate the effect of inequality on growth through differences in the
life expectancy of individuals.
Whereas the isolation of the life expectancy channel is made at the cost of building a
very simple economy, the advantage of this simplicity is that the human capital part relies
exclusively on elements that can be measured, such as years of schooling and the Mincer
coefﬁcient.
1.3 Preferences








The expected lifetime utility is deﬁned over consumption when young (ct
it) and consump-
tion when old (ct
it+1), where the second period utility is discounted by the endogenous
survival probability πt
it+1(ht￿1
it ) and by the rate of time preference ρ, where γ = 1/(1+ρ).
During the ﬁrst period, agents can ﬁnance their consumption with income gained
from the production of goods (yt
it) which, as equation (4) states, is a function of the time




Notice that, since income is deﬁned in efﬁciency units, preferences are also deﬁned over
consumption in efﬁciency units, an assumption which does not affect the ﬁrst-order con-
ditions of the optimisation problem. In the second period, total income is used to ﬁnance





Many models separate the period when individuals acquire formal education from
the period in which individuals work and consume. Nonetheless, in our model we seek
to point out that in a lot of developing countries many individuals start working in their
childhood. Moreover, some theoretical models also incorporate bequests as a basic re-
source for ﬁnancing education years. However, as long as bequests are a function of par-
ents’ incomes, this constitutes an important channel through which the human capital of
parents affects the human capital of their descendants. In fact, bequests play a crucial
role in models that study the link between inequality and growth through imperfect creditHUMAN CAPITAL INEQUALITY AND LIFE EXPECTANCY 8
markets since under credit constraints family wealth is the only source to ﬁnance an in-
vestment project. Hence, due to the fact that we are interested in analyzing these effects
exclusively through the endogenous life expectancy, we assume there are no bequests in
the model.3
1.4 Optimal Education Years
The optimal behaviour of agents is to choose the amount of human capital that maximizes
their intertemporal utility function. Thus, individual i chooses the time devoted to school-
ing (1 ￿ Lt
it) that maximizes (8) subject to the production functions (4) and (6), the accu-
mulation of human capital (5), the budget restrictions (9) and (10), and the non negativity
and inequality restrictions (0 ￿ Lt
it ￿ 1).
For 0 ￿ Lt
it ￿ 1, the ﬁrst order condition for this problem gives place to a function
of ht
it+1 in terms of ht￿1










As we show below, the time individuals devote to accumulating human capital increases
with their second period survival probability, which is a function of parents’ human capi-
tal. Since the income in the second period depends on human capital, the longer they ex-
pect to live the greater their human capital investment. Agents with no probability of liv-
ingduringthesecondperiod, becausethehumancapitaloftheirparentsistoolow, willnot
allocate any fraction of their time to acquiring education. In contrast, if πt
it+1(ht￿1
it ) = 1,
then (1￿ Lt
it) will reach its maximum value.
In other words, the time individuals devote to education in this model will be a
function of the schooling years of their parents, but exclusively through the endogenous
life expectancy mechanism, since intergenerational transfers from parents to children are
nonexistent.
Equation (11) also makes clear that for an interior solution schooling years is a con-
cave function of the survival probability. Therefore, a mean-preserving spread in the sur-
vival probability will lower average education.4 The intuition is straightforward, if we
3 ChackrabortyandDas(2005)analyseamodelofintergenerationalmobilityandequalitythatoperatesthrough
investment in health capital. In this model the intergenerational transmission of poverty is through bequest and,
in order to obtain persistence they assume that annuities markets are imperfect. In contrast, our model is able
to explain the relationship between human capital inequality, life expectancy and human capital accumulation
without the need to rely on any imperfection in the credit or annuities market.
4 Following Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970, 1971), if π2 is a mean-presearving spread over π1 and g a concave
function then:
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move mass from the middle of the distribution of the survival probability to the tails,
keeping the mean constant, the concavity of the function implies that the low human cap-
ital stock of poor individuals more than compensates the slight increase in the human
capital of rich individuals. That is, as a result of the concavity of ht
it+1(πt
it+1) the average
stock of human capital reduces after a mean-presearving spread because the decrease in
the human capital of poor agents exceeds the increase in human capital of wealthy agents.
Therefore, equation (11) implies a negative effect of human capital inequality on growth
even if the relationship between parents’ human capital and offspring’s survival proba-
bility were linear. In the next section we will show that the relationship between human
capital and survival probability is also concave, by which the basic negative effect of hu-
man capital inequality on growth will be ampliﬁed.
2. Inequality and Growth
In this section we quantitatively analyse the relationship between inequality in the distri-
bution of education, life expectancy, human capital accumulation and per capita income.
Firstly, we parameterize the model. We then display the numerical results of the evolution
of human capital over time. Finally, we explore how inequality may affect life expectancy,
human capital and growth.
2.1 Parameterization
In order to propose a functional form for equation (1) it is convenient to review the empir-
ical evidence on the relationship between socio-economic status and mortality. The neg-
ative association between socio-economic status and mortality has been widely analyse
in the literature. For instance, Marmot et al. (1991) found a positive association between
the grade of employment of British civil servants and their health status in the Whitehall
II study, a result already obtained in the ﬁrst Whitehall study initiated in 1967. More re-
cently, using data for the United States, Deaton and Paxon (1999) have found that higher
income is associated with lower mortality, whereas Lleras-Muney (2005) ﬁndings reveal






















for γ, α and πt
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that education has a large negative causal effect on mortality.
Some papers have also suggested that this relationship is not linear. Smith (1999)
analyses the relationship between individuals’ health and their income or wealth using
the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) for 12,000 American individuals. He estimates
an order probit model with self reported health status as the dependent variable.5 The
results show that the relationship between self reported health and income or wealth is
non-linear, and that the positive and statistically signiﬁcant effect of income and wealth
on self reported health status decreases as socioeconomic status increases.
However, Case et al. (2002) suggest that the gradient, that is, the positive associa-
tion between health and socioeconomic status, has its origins in childhood. Using data for
the United States they provide evidence of a positive relationship between household in-
come and children’s health. In addition, they ﬁnd that the positive relationship increases
with the age of the children. Currie and Stabile (2003) use data on Canadian children and
conﬁrm these results. Moreover, the authors show that the health of the children born in
low socioeconomic status families deteriorates with age because these children suffer from
more health shocks. Likewise, Currie and Hyson (1999) ﬁnd that being born into a low so-
cioeconomic status family increases the probability of reporting poor health at the ages of
23 and 33. Other studies also show that parents’ education has a positive impact on child
height, which may be used as an indicator of long-run health status, even after controlling
for parents’ income (see, for example, Thomas et al. 1990 and 1991). In addition, using an
instrumental variable procedure for the United States, Currie and Moretti (2003) suggest
that the positive effect from maternal education on children health is causal.
On this matter, there are medical studies that point out the important role that the
environment plays during pregnancy and on newborn children in determining future dis-
eases and illnesses that an individual may suffer from.6 For example, Ravelli et al. (1998)
investigate glucose tolerance in people born around the time of the famine in the Nether-
lands during 1944-1945. They found that prenatal exposure to famine, mainly during late
gestation, was associated to decreased glucose tolerance in adults increasing the risk of di-
abetes. Barker (1997) focuses on the “fetal origins” hypothesis which states that human
foetuses change their physiology and metabolisms in order to adapt to a limited supply of
nutrients. These programmed changes may be the origins of a number of diseases in later
life such as hypertension, coronary heart disease, strokes and diabetes.
Therefore, it is realistic to assume that an individuals life expectancy will depend
on the socioeconomic status of the family in which the individual is born into and, more
5 Smith et al. (2001), using the HRS, ﬁnd that subjective perceptions of mortality are good predictors of ob-
served mortality.
6 Marmot and Wadsworth (1997) review some studies that link health in childhood with health in adulthood.HUMAN CAPITAL INEQUALITY AND LIFE EXPECTANCY 11
speciﬁcally on the human capital of their parents. In line with Blackburn and Cipriani








it )φ with v and φ > 0. (12)








and is bounded by π and π since
πt






it ) = π ￿ 1. (15)
Apart from its theoretical properties, on an empirical basis this function captures
the relationship between life expectancy and human capital across countries very well, for
appropriate values of its parameters. We rely on aggregate data due to the fact that micro
data relating parents’ education with offspring life expectancy are not available for a large
number of countries. Figure 1 shows the dispersion between life expectancy at birth in
1985, taken from the World Bank, and the average schooling years for the population aged
25 and over in 1960, from Barro and Lee (2001). The different reference years for these two
variables intends to ensure the exogeneity of human capital and to capture our assumption
that the survival probability in t + 1 of the generation born in t is a function of the human
capital of the generation born in t ￿ 1.7 This ﬁgure shows a clear concave relationship
between the stock of human capital and life expectancy.8 The ﬁtted function in Figure 1 is
obtained for θ = 40, π = 0, π = 1.0, v = 0.5 and φ = 1.4. Given these parameters, agents
7 Lifeexpectancyatbirthisdeﬁnedasthenumberofyearsanewborninfantwouldliveifprevailingpatternsof
mortalityatthetimeofbirthweretoremainthesamethroughoutitslife. Sincelifeexpectancyhasbeenincreasing
during recent decades, the prevailing patterns of mortality in 1960 changed in 1970 and so on. Therefore, life
expectancy in 1985 also proxies the mortality patterns in 1985 of people born before this year.
8 The concave shape holds with the different available years in the sample. In addition, infant mortality relates
negatively at a decreasing rate with the stock of human capital. The relationship between infant mortality and
the stock of human capital may proxy the relationship between the survival probability of one generation and
the stock of human capital of the previous one. Moreover, we ﬁnd a convex relationship between adult mortality
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Fig. 1: Life expectancy in 1985 versus average years of schooling in 1960, 92 countries.
have a life expectancy of 40 years if their parents have no schooling. Since the model
considers two equal periods, we assume a duration of 40 years for every period. Notice
that, since this function is identiﬁed using cross-country data, we are just approximating
the curvature of the function for the cross-section of individual in a given country, which
may look ﬂatter. If that were the case, it would suggest that the life-expectancy channel,
including the possibility of multiple steady states, is stronger in a cross-country setting.
The Mincer coefﬁcient α in the schooling function is set to 0.1, in the middle of the
range from 0.05 to 0.15 of its estimated values, as shown by Krueger and Lindahl (2001).
Finally, the rate of time preference, ρ, is calibrated as 0.021 in order to obtain a high steady
state in which the years of education are equal to 16, that is, the average of the maximum
number of years of formal education in OECD countries (such as, for example, in the
sample used by De la Fuente and Doménech, 2006). With these reasonable parameter
values the model is capable of generating multiple steady states. Nevertheless, we also
explore how the changes in these parameters affect the properties of the model.
2.2 The Evolution of Human Capital
Equation (11) summarizes the dynamics of the model across generations and is repre-
sented in Figure 2, given the values of the parameters discussed above and the properties
of the ﬁrst order condition (see Appendix A).9 As can be observed, the number of years
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Years of schooling, parent.
Fig. 2: Human capital dynamics.
devoted to education increases with the human capital of the parents. The economy ex-
hibits three different steady states: there are two low steady states with values of zero and
around 2.3 years of schooling, and a high steady state of 16 years of schooling. However,
as ht￿1
it = ht
it+1 = 2.3 is not a stable steady state, the dynamics of the model mean that
individuals with parents having less than 2.3 years of education (as is the case, for exam-
ple, with more than 40% of countries in Figure 1 which are below this value) will converge
to the lowest steady state with no schooling. The fact that the steady state of 2.3 years of
education is unstable can be easily seen by following the dynamics displayed in Figure 2.
The picture shows that if parents have 2.3 years of education their children will also have
2.3 years of education and the children of their children also. However, if the parents are
placed in the neighbourhood of 2.3 years of education their future generations will end up
in a different steady state.10
In Figure 3 we present the sensitivity of human capital steady states to changes in
multiple steady states and similar dynamics for human capital to Figure 2.
10 Othermodelswithheterogeneousagentsthatgeneratemultiplesteadystateswithoutassumingnon-convexities
in the production process include Moav (2005) or Eicher and García-Peñalosa (2001). Azariadis (2001) offers an
excellent survey of the literature about poverty traps. For empirical papers that give evidence in favour of multi-
ple steady state models see for example, Quah (1993a, b, 1996), who uses annual transitional matrix methodology
to estimate long-run tendencies of incomes across countries. His ﬁndings suggest a polarization, instead of con-
vergence, across world incomes. Kremer et al. (2001) estimate transition probabilities over ﬁve-year intervals
rather than annual intervals. Their resulting ergodic distribution gives a mass of 72 per cent of countries in the
richest income category. However, they obtain that the transition to this steady state is very slow. In addition,
if recent trends in international income mobility continue, their results predict an increase in the coefﬁcient of
polarization and the standard deviation of log income over the years.HUMAN CAPITAL INEQUALITY AND LIFE EXPECTANCY 14
the different parameters of our model. An increase in the returns of education or in the life
horizon (α and θ, respectively) and a reduction of the rate of time preference (ρ) produce an
upward shift in the function bacause investing in education is more proﬁtable. Similarly,
an increase of the survival probability for any given level of ht￿1
it , through higher π, φ or
ω, creates more education incentives.
Figure 2 also makes clear that individuals who are born into poor families with low
levels of education (ht￿1
it ’ 0) will have a low survival probability (πi
t+1(ht￿1
it ) ’ 0) and,
therefore, have no incentives to accumulate human capital (ht
it+1 ’ 0), devoting all their
time to working in the production sector (Li
t = 1), with low productivity. This low steady
state is found in some Latin American, African or South Asian countries, in which many
children born into poor families, with no education, live for a short period of time, have no
access to education and work as unskilled workers from childhood, affecting a large share
of the world population. For example, using Barro and Lee’s (2001) data for the year 2000,
at least 20% of the population aged 15 and over was illiterate in 50 of the 108 countries
in the sample. In 25 of these countries, at least 40% of the population was illiterate. The
share of the population with no education was 80 percent in Mali and Niger, where life
expectancy at birth was 43 and 46 years, respectively.
The dynamics of the model also predict that governments could bring individuals
out of the no-schooling poverty trap if they guarantee access to a minimum level of edu-
cation for some generations and increase life expectancy. Consequently, the policy impli-
cations of our model are also different to those of previous contributions. For example, in
models in which poverty persistence is the result of credit market imperfections and non-
convexities, as in Galor and Zeira (1993), restricted poor individuals would invest more
human capital if capital markets were perfect. In our model, there are no credit market
imperfections, but poor individuals invest optimally a low amount of human capital since
their low life expectancy increases their opportunity cost of becoming educated. Thus,
as shown in Figure 3, according to this model public founds should be better targeted to
measures that increase the survival perspectives of the poor and the returns to school-
ing. Incentives to invest in education are especially important as they would increase the
survival probability of future generations at the same time.
2.3 Human Capital Distribution, Life Expectancy and Economic Growth
In accordance with the previous results, the initial distribution of wealth in this model will
determine the long-run average human capital and average income in the economy. In
light of the simplifying assumptions we have made, the model does not exhibit endoge-
nous growth in the steady states, but it does offer a useful explanation of the per capita
income differentials across countries. Thus, the fewer the number of individuals with
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Fig. 3: Sensitivity analysis of human capital steady states to changes in the benchmark









































Fig. 4: Average survival probability and human capital equality index (ht￿1
p,t /ht￿1
r,t ).
income in the economy.
Undertheassumptionofimperfectcreditmarketsandindivisibilitiesinhumancap-
ital investment, Galor and Zeira (1993) obtain similar results. In their model the initial dis-
tribution of wealth determines the share of the population with no education that works as
unskilled workers. Likewise, their model also shows the possibility of two steady states,
a low steady state with unskilled workers and a high steady state with skilled workers.
However, the underlying assumptions of their model are quite different from ours. In
Galor and Zeira’s model, the assumption of imperfect credit markets causes that the dis-
tribution of wealth inﬂuences economic activity in the short term, and indivisibilities in
human capital investment are crucial in order to preserve these results in the long run. In
contrast, the results of our model are mainly due to the assumption that differences in the
survival probabilities among individuals are a function of their parents’ human capital.
In this subsection we display some quantitative results that illustrate how greater
inequality in the distribution of education may reduce an economy’s life expectancy and
how this affects the human capital in the following generations. In the ﬁrst place we show
that, given two countries with the same average human capital stock in one period, the
country with the greater inequality will exhibit lower average survival probability and,
therefore, a lower average stock of human capital in the following period. Assuming that
the economy is populated by a fraction λ = 0.25 of rich individuals, denoted by r, and
a fraction (1 ￿ λ) of poor individuals, denoted by p, in Figure 4 we have represented theHUMAN CAPITAL INEQUALITY AND LIFE EXPECTANCY 17
Table 1
Dynamics of human capital
Initial Initial Average human capital
equality human Generations
index capital 1 2 3 4 5
1.00 3.00 7.05 13.96 15.80 15.98 16.00
0.75 3.00 6.79 13.56 15.75 15.98 16.00
0.44 3.00 4.86 6.30 9.92 14.80 15.89
0.43 3.00 4.73 3.90 3.99 4.00 4.00
0.30 3.00 3.36 3.93 3.99 4.00 4.00
average survival probability, for two economies with averages of 5 and 6 schooling years,
as a function of the equality index (e), which is constructed as the ratio between the human







As can be observed, for an equality index higher than 0.4 the average survival probability
increases very slowly as equality increases, but when the index is below 0.4, this probabil-
ity decreases rapidly as the distribution of human capital becomes more unequal.
As the distribution of human capital affects the average life expectancy of the econ-
omy, inequality will also have a negative effect on the steady state level of average school-
ing years and, therefore, on the growth rate of the economy during the transition to the
steady state. In Table 1 we have illustrated this implication of the model. Let us assume
again that the economy is populated by a fraction λ = 0.25 of rich individuals and a frac-
tion (1 ￿ λ) of poor individuals such that the average human capital of the economy is
given by
ht = λht￿1
r,t + (1￿ λ)ht￿1
p,t . (17)
For a starting level of schooling ht there are different combinations ht￿1
r,t and ht￿1
p,t satisfy-
ing this condition, with important implications for the distribution of human capital. For
example, if human capital is perfectly distributed then ht￿1
r,t = ht￿1
p,t = ht and et = 1. On
the contrary, if the human capital of rich individuals is the high steady-state level, such
that ht￿1
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In Table 1 we have assumed that initially ht is equal to 3 years, above the unstable steady
state, and we have simulated the dynamics of average human capital, using equation (11)
for the two groups of individuals and different initial distributions, which are character-
ized by the equality index. Given the calibrated values of the parameters, the steady state
is reached after ﬁve generations if human capital is evenly distributed. Economies with a




p,t+j = 16 and the tran-
sition is more rapid the higher the equality in the initial distribution of human capital. In
contrast, when et ￿ 0.43 the average human capital reaches a low steady state in which
h
t+j￿1
r,t+j = 16 and h
t+j￿1
p,t+j = 0. An equality index below 0.43 implies that poor individu-
als start with an initial level of education that is lower than the unstable steady state. In
this case, poor individuals converge to the low steady state with zero years of education,
whereas rich individuals converge to the high steady state with 16 years of education. The
results imply that even two economies that start with the same level of education could
end up in quite a different situation if one of them has high inequality levels. Therefore,
these results highlight the fact that the distribution of human capital could have extraor-
dinary effects upon the economic prospects of societies.
Finally, weanalysetheeffectofchangesinthedistributionofpopulation. Uptonow
we have considered the distribution of population between rich and poor individuals to
be constant. However, the existence of multiple steady states makes clear that at lower
levels of education the percentage of poor individuals is crucial for the economy to escape
the poverty trap. As an example, our simulations suggest that an economy that starts
with an average of 2 years of schooling may end up in a steady state with 4, 2.4 or 0.8
years of schooling depending on whether the percentage of poor individuals in the society
was 75, 85 or 95%, respectively. It is also convenient to note that the percentage of poor
individuals can be easily related to a common measure of inequality used in empirical
studiessuchastheGinicoefﬁcient. Infact, ifpoorindividualshavezeroyearsofschooling,
the human capital Gini coefﬁcient is equal to the percentage of poor individuals in the
population.11 Therefore, the implications of the model suggest that we should observe
that those countries that initially showed high levels of human capital inequality should
display lower human capital investment rates in the following generations.
3. Empirical Evidence
This section analyses the relationship between human capital inequality, life expectancy
and human capital accumulation empirically. In order to test the link between inequality
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and growth through the life expectancy channel we estimate some implications of the
model. In the ﬁrst place we study if more unequal societies have experienced lower life
expectancy. We then proceed to analyse if greater life expectancy is related with more
human capital accumulation.
In the analysis of the relationship between inequality and life expectancy we focus
on a cross-section that includes 92 countries. Following the model we ask if the distribu-
tion of education in one generation is related with lower average life expectancy in the
following generation. In particular, using the calibrated function for the survival probabil-
ity, we have estimated the following equation:
LEi,1985 = θmin + (θmax ￿ θmin)πi,1985(hi,1960) + µGinih
i,1960, (19)
where i refers to the different countries in the sample. The dependent variable is life ex-
pectancy in 1985 (from the World Bank), h is measured as the average years of schooling
in 1960 (from Barro and Lee, 2001), estimated surviving probability πi is given by equa-
tion (12), and Ginih is the Gini coefﬁcient of human capital in 1960 taken from Castelló and
Doménech (2002), in deviations from the sample average.12 The estimated value of θmin is
the life expectancy of a country where πi(hi) = 0 and the Gini coefﬁcient is equal to the
sample average. Since the endogenous variable is dated 1985 and the regressors 1960 we
minimize possible endogeneity problems in this regression.
The results of the estimation of equation (19) by OLS are presented in Table 2. In
column (1) we regress LE on a constant and Ginih, which in equation (19) is equivalent to
imposing that θmax = θmin. The results show that the Gini coefﬁcient of human capital has
a negative and statistically signiﬁcant effect on life expectancy, conﬁrming the prediction
of the model that countries with a more unequal distribution of human capital will exhibit
lower life expectancy. Moreover, the effect of human capital inequality on life expectancy
is also economically meaningful: a reduction in one standard deviation in the Gini index
(0.28) would increase life expectancy by 8.28 years. For example, if in 1960 Sub-Saharan
African countries (where Ginih = 0.78) had had a level of human capital inequality similar
to that of Latin American countries (Ginih = 0.47), in 1985 life expectancy in Sub-Saharan
Africa would have been 9.23 years higher. More strikingly, if human capital inequality in
Sub-Saharan Africa had been that of OECD countries (Ginih = 0.23) the increment in life
expectancy would have been about 16.3 years.
In column (2) we also include two dummy variables d1 (Lesotho, Malawi, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, Uganda and Bolivia ) and d2 (Tunisia, Iraq, Kuwait and Portugal) which con-
trol for outliers, since their residuals exceed more than twice the estimated standard error
12 See Appendix B for the deﬁnition and source of the variables used in this section.HUMAN CAPITAL INEQUALITY AND LIFE EXPECTANCY 20
Table 2
Life expectancy and inequality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
θmin 64.385￿￿￿ 64.728￿￿￿ 66.520￿￿￿ 54.310￿￿￿ 52.081￿￿￿ 56.815￿￿￿
(0.604) (0.495) (0.775) (4.404) (2.889) (2.789)
θmax 64.385‡ 64.728‡ 66.520‡ 71.077￿￿￿ 73.176￿￿￿ 73.380￿￿￿
(7.505) (5.025) (4.690)
µ -29.577￿￿￿ -29.763￿￿￿ -25.099￿￿￿ -14.431￿￿ -10.687￿￿ -10.443￿￿
(2.007) (1.578) (2.031) (6.961) (5.049) (4.700)
d1 -12.832￿￿￿ -9.505￿￿￿ -13.539￿￿￿ -10.721￿￿￿
(0.861) (0.876) (1.109) (1.358)
d2 11.344￿￿￿ 8.311￿￿￿ 11.759￿￿￿ 8.497￿￿￿







R2 0.670 0.833 0.884 0.696 0.873 0.903
Obs. 92 92 92 92 92 92
Notes: OLS estimations. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ￿￿￿ 1 per cent signiﬁcance level, ￿￿ 5
per cent signiﬁcance level, ￿ 10 per cent signiﬁcance level. ‡ restricted parameter. Dependent variable:
Life Expectancy in 1985. Explanatory variables: human capital Gini coefﬁcient in 1960, simulated
survival probability computed with average schooling years in the total population aged 25 years
and over measured in 1960, d1 and d2 are country dummies (d1 includes Lesotho, Malawi, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, Uganda and Bolivia and d2 includes Tunisia, Iraq, Kuwait and Portugal), and regional
dummies for Latin American, Sub-Saharan African and East Asian countries.
of the residuals. The results show that the human capital Gini coefﬁcient and the two dum-
mies alone explain more than 80 percent of the variance in life expectancy across countries.
However, the fact that Sub-Saharan African countries are distinguished by very low life
expectancy as well as very high human capital inequality implies that the coefﬁcient of
the human capital Gini index could be capturing region-speciﬁc characteristics. Thus, in
column (3) we control for continental dummies. The results show that although the coefﬁ-
cient of the dummies for Sub-Saharan African and Latin American countries are negative
and statistically signiﬁcant, the coefﬁcient of the human capital Gini index also continues
to be negative and statistically signiﬁcant.
In the remaining columns we introduce the estimated survival probability, π, as an
additional regressor, allowing θmax and θmin to differ. The results displayed in column (4)
suggest that even controlling for the estimated survival probability the negative effect ofHUMAN CAPITAL INEQUALITY AND LIFE EXPECTANCY 21
human capital inequality on life expectancy holds. Moreover, the negative effect remains
when we control for outliers (column (5)) and continental dummies (column (6)). The
estimated size effect of inequality on life expectancy is reduced in the last column, but
remains sizeable; a reduction of one standard deviation in education inequality would
increase life expectancy in 3 years.
Therefore, these results suggest that more unequal societies experienced on average
lowerlifeexpectancythanthosewithamoreevendistribution. Inparticular, holdingother
things constant, those countries with more inequality in the distribution of education in
1960 are the societies that had lower life expectancy in 1985.
To complete the analysis, we need to take a second step to check if more life ex-
pectancy is related to greater rates of human capital accumulation. For this reason, in
Table 3 the dependent variable is the human capital accumulation rate in 1985, measured
as the total gross enrolment ratio in secondary education. The explanatory variables in-
clude the log of the per capita income in 1960, life expectancy in 1985, the average stock
of human capital in 1960, measured as the average schooling years in the total population
aged 25 and over, and the fertility rates in 1960. According to the model, since the distribu-
tion of education is a relevant channel for the effects of life expectancy on human capital
accumulation, we use two-stage least squares and instrument life expectancy in 1985 with
the human capital Gini coefﬁcient in 1960.
The results displayed in Columns (1)-(3) of Table 3 show that life expectancy is posi-
tively related to human capital accumulation even when controlling for per capita income,
average years of schooling and regional dummies. In column (4) we check the effect of hu-
man capital inequality on human capital accumulation directly. Then, instead of including
the life expectancy in the estimated equation, we analyse the direct effect of the inequality
on the distribution of education including the human capital Gini index in the set of ex-
planatory variables. The results show that the coefﬁcient of the human capital Gini index
is negative and statistically signiﬁcant. In addition, the coefﬁcient of the level of educa-
tion is no longer statistically signiﬁcant when we control for the distribution of education.
However, if human capital inequality affects human capital accumulation mainly through
a negative association with life expectancy, we should expect that once we control for life
expectancy the effect of human capital inequality on human capital accumulation dimin-
ishes. Certainly, column (5) shows that once we control for life expectancy the coefﬁcient
of the human capital Gini index is no longer statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that the
relationship between education inequality and human capital accumulation is mainly due
to the negative association between education inequality and life expectancy.
Since there are other demographic variables that are highly related to human capital
inequality such as the fertility rates, we include the fertility rates in the set of explanatoryHUMAN CAPITAL INEQUALITY AND LIFE EXPECTANCY 22
Table 3
Dependent variable: Human Capital Accumulation in 1985
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
constant -1.380￿￿￿ -0.787￿￿￿ -0.909￿￿￿ -0.050 -0.953￿￿￿ 0.174
(0.123) (0.268) (0.265) (0.276) (0.286) (0.394)
lny60 0.042 0.048 0.030 0.088￿￿ 0.027 0.070
(0.046) (0.048) (0.033) (0.037) (0.035) (0.045)
LE85 0.025￿￿￿ 0.012￿￿ 0.019￿￿￿ 0.020￿￿￿
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
School60 0.044￿￿￿ 0.021￿ 0.003 0.022 0.004
(0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014)
Ginih




laam -0.141￿￿￿ -0.202￿￿￿ -0.138￿￿￿ -0.174￿￿￿
(0.041) (0.041) (0.043) (0.058)
safrica -0.083 -0.242￿￿￿ -0.075 -0.237￿￿￿
(0.065) (0.057) (0.061) (0.061)
asiae -0.037 0.004 -0.039 0.011
(0.063) (0.086) (0.063) (0.089)
R2 0.804 0.796 0.851 0.777 0.851 0.780
Obs. 77 77 77 77 77 77
Notes: 2SLS estimations. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ￿￿￿ 1 per cent signiﬁcance level, ￿￿
5 per cent signiﬁcance level, ￿ 10 per cent signiﬁcance level. Dependent variable: Human capital
accumulation in 1985, measured as the gross enrolment ratio in secondary education. Explanatory
variables: log of per capita income in 1960 (lny60), life expectancy in 1985 (LE85), average schooling
years in the total population aged 25 years and over measured in 1960 (School60), human capital Gini
coefﬁcient in 1960 (Ginih
60), fertility rates (Fertility60) and regional dummies for Latin American (laam),
Sub-Saharan African (safrica) and East Asian (asiae) countries. The instrument for LE85 in columns (1)-
(3)isthehumancapitalGinicoefﬁcientmeasuredin1960(Ginih
60) andincolumn(5)itislifeexpectancy
measured in 1960.HUMAN CAPITAL INEQUALITY AND LIFE EXPECTANCY 23
variables in column (6) instead of life expectancy. The results show that when we control
for fertility rates the coefﬁcient of the human capital Gini coefﬁcient scarcely changes and
continues to be negative and statistically signiﬁcant. Hence, this result suggests that the
negative effect of human capital inequality on human capital accumulation rates is mainly
driven by a negative association between human capital inequality and life expectancy.
Theseresultsalsorevealthat, althoughthecoefﬁcientoftheLatinAmericandummy
is smaller when life expectancy is accounted for, it remains statistically signiﬁcant in all
speciﬁcations, indicating that there are other factors, apart from life expectancy, that ex-
plain the low human capital investment rates in Latin America. On the contrary, once we
control for life expectancy, the Sub-Saharan Africa dummy is no longer statistically signif-
icant, suggesting that the backwardness of human capital accumulation in this region is
mainly explained by reduced life expectancy. The impact of an increase in life expectancy
is also economically meaningful. For example, according to column (3), an increase in one
standard deviation in life expectancy (9.98 years) would have raised the human capital
accumulation rate in 1985 by 0.19 points. This impact is quite high given that the total
gross enrolment ratio in secondary education in Sub-Saharan Africa in 1985 was only 0.21
points.
In line with our theoretical model, in the empirical section we have used life ex-
pectancy as the variable that connects inequality and human capital investment rates.
However, our model is quite restrictive in the timing of mortality and it rules out any
early death before the age of 40. As is well known, life expectancy is highly related to
infant mortality and some studies have found that child mortality should not necessar-
ily have a negative inﬂuence on education when mortality is realised before education
starts (e.g., Doepke, 2005, Azarnert, 2006). Nevertheless, the empirical evidence on the
relationship between longevity and the accumulation of human capital holds with alter-
native variables such as adult mortality. For instance, using adult mortality rates, instead
of life expectancy, Lorentzen et al. (2006) obtain similar results to those in Table 3 regard-
ing the positive effect of longevity on the accumulation of human capital and the role of
the Sub-Saharan Africa dummy in this relationship.13 Moreover, the prevalence of AIDS,
which is nowadays the main cause of reduction in life expectancy around the world, af-
fects mainly adult people. For instance, according to data from UNAIDS/WHO, at the
end of 2004, in Sub-Saharan Africa 23.2 out of the 25 million people living with HIV/AIDS
were adults. These staggering ﬁgures and the previous evidence suggest that the human
capital investment rates of present and future generations in Sub-Saharan Africa could be
seriously affected. In fact, using a panel of African countries from the period 1985-2000,
13 Our results also hold if in Table 3 we replace life expectancy in 1985 by adult mortality in 1980. The difference
in the reference years is due to data availability (from World Development Indicators, 2004).HUMAN CAPITAL INEQUALITY AND LIFE EXPECTANCY 24
Kalemli-Ozcan (2006) ﬁnds that AIDS has had a strong negative effect on the primary
school enrolment rates in this region.14
On the whole, the empirical evidence of this section gives support to our theoret-
ical model, which relates inequality and growth through a negative association between
inequality and life expectancy. On the one hand, the results suggest that more unequal
societies have experienced, on average, lower life expectancy. On the other hand, greater
life expectancy is associated with greater human capital accumulation rates. In addition,
when we analyse the direct effect of human capital inequality on the human capital ac-
cumulation rates, the negative and statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient of the human capital
Gini index disappears once we control for life expectancy. On the contrary, the negative
effect of the human capital Gini index on human capital accumulation rates remains when
we control for other demographic variables, such as fertility rates, suggesting that the as-
sociation between human capital inequality and human capital accumulation is mainly
driven by the life expectancy channel.
4. Conclusions
This paper has analysed an alternative mechanism which explains why inequality in the
distribution of income or wealth may be harmful for human capital accumulation. The
underlying mechanism is based on the assumption that the life expectancy of individuals
is somehow conditioned by the socioeconomic status of the family which they are born
into. In particular, we have assumed that life expectancy is an increasing function of the
human capital of the parents, an assumption strongly supported by empirical evidence.
Based on this assumption the paper develops an overlapping generation model in
which individuals always live through their ﬁrst period of life and face an endogenous
probability of surviving the entire second period. Given this probability, they choose the
amount of time devoted to accumulating human capital that maximizes their intertem-
poral utility. As expected, the results show that the time individuals devote to schooling
increases with their expected survival probability.
To analyse the relationship between inequality and growth we have simulated a
life expectancy function according to the data of schooling years provided by Barro and
14 Nevertheless, the positive effect of longevity on income and growth has been questioned recently. Acemoglu
and Johnson (2006) have challenged the positive effect of life expectancy on economic growth by estimating
a model in ﬁrst differences and instrumenting life expectancy by predicted mortality. The authors do not ﬁnd
evidencethatanexogenousincreaseinlifeexpectancyimpliesanincreaseinthegrowthrateofpercapitaincome.
However, Sub Saharan African countries are not included in their study due to data limitations. Other articles
have also challenged the impact of AIDS on income. For example, Young (2005) simulates the impact of AIDS on
the welfare of future generations in South Africa. The simulated results suggest that, by lowering fertility and
population, AIDS could increase the standard of living of survivors.HUMAN CAPITAL INEQUALITY AND LIFE EXPECTANCY 25
Lee (2001). The empirical evidence shows a clear relationship between average school-
ing years across countries and life expectancy. Given the calibrated survival probability
function, the model exhibits multiple steady states depending on initial conditions. Rich
individuals, born into families whose parents have high levels of education, have higher
life expectancy. Their long life expectancy encourages them to devote a large number of
years in education. On the contrary, individuals who are born into poor families have low
life expectancy. Accordingly, since the time they expect to beneﬁt from the returns to edu-
cation is very short, they devote little time to accumulating human capital. These results
imply that the initial distribution of education determines the evolution of the aggregate
variables in the model. In particular, the model shows that inequality may have negative
effects upon the growth rate of the economy during the transition to the steady state.
Although the result of multiple steady states seems to be similar to that in mod-
els which relate inequality and growth assuming that capital markets are not perfect, the
reasonsthatexplaintheexistenceofpovertytrapsarequitedifferent. Creditmarketimper-
fections imply that capable individuals do not undertake a proﬁtable investment because
they do not have the necessary funds to ﬁnance the project. The interesting ﬁnding of our
paper is that individuals who do not have restrictions to ﬁnance their education may not
undertake an investment project, such as education, when their life expectancy is very low,
since the time they are going to enjoy the returns of the investment is too short.
The empirical evidence supports the life expectancy channel. In the ﬁrst place we
analyse the relationship between inequality and life expectancy. We then question whether
higher life expectancy is related to greater human capital accumulation rates. The results
suggest that most of the negative relationship between inequality and human capital accu-
mulation is due to the strong negative association between human capital inequality and
life expectancy.
The policy implications of this study suggest that governments could bring individ-
uals out of the no-schooling poverty trap by guaranteeing a minimum compulsory level
of education for some generations and, at the same time, investing in health policies that
increase life expectancy. Here, the contribution of external aid to ﬁnance public education
and health programmes may be crucial. All of them are measures that, at the same time,
would generate longer average life expectancy and higher standards of living in the less
developed economies in the medium and long-term.HUMAN CAPITAL INEQUALITY AND LIFE EXPECTANCY 26
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6. Appendix A
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Lt
it ￿ 1 (A1.5)









Applying Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the inequality restriction, the ﬁrst order con-

















The interior solution (0 < Lt
it < 1) implies that:
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where Lt
it is a decreasing function of the expected survival probability.
Given the values of the parameters for the survival probability function, discussed
in subsection 2.1, when ht￿1
it = 0 then πt
it+1(ht￿1
it ) = 0, that is, when parents have no













it ￿ 1 (A1.12)
If Lt
it were not restricted, the optimal value for Lt
it would tend to inﬁnity. However, the re-
strictions cause the optimal value to take the corner solution in which Lt
it = 1. This means
that individuals who do not live in the second period do not accumulate human capital
and devote all their time to work in order to maximize their ﬁrst period consumption.HUMAN CAPITAL INEQUALITY AND LIFE EXPECTANCY 31
7. Appendix B
Table B: Data deﬁnition and source
Variable Deﬁnition Source
Income (y) Real GDP per capita (chain), Heston, Summers and Aten,
1996 international prices PWT 6.1 (2002)
Education inequality (Ginih) Human capital Gini coefﬁcient Castello and Domenech (2002)
for population 25 years and over
Level of education (School) Average schooling years in the Barro and Lee (2001)
total population aged 25 years
and over
Life Expectancy (LE) Life expectancy at birth WDI (2004) and
Barro and Lee (1994)
Human capital accumulation Gross enrolment ratio in Unesco, WDI (2004) and
secondary education Barro and Lee (1994)
Fertility Rate (Fertility) Total fertility rate Barro and Lee (1994)
(children per woman)